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The 1996 Federal Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act removed most price-
contingent agricultural subsidies and replaced them with Production Flexibility Contracts (PFC) 
—lump sum payments with few ties to farmers’ production decisions or prices.  The payments 
were envisioned as a way to maintain income transfers to agricultural interests while minimizing 
production distortions.  The extent to which these lump-sum or “decoupled” payments affect 
production has been a significant dispute among academics and in recent World Trade 
Organization negotiations (FAO, 2005; Sumner, 2005). 
 
While a large and growing literature examines the relationship between agricultural production 
and the decoupled payments embodied in the PFC payments of the FAIR Act (see OECD, 2005 
for a review), several fundamental problems plague this literature. Because decoupled subsidies 
are essentially factor-specific subsidies to land, farmers chose the subsidy they now receive by 
historically choosing the amount and quality of land dedicated to program crops.  Thus, while 
PFC payments were largely decoupled from contemporaneous planting decisions, they were 
intimately tied to historical decisions, decisions that were tied as much (or more) to land 
attributes as to subsidy levels.  Research that ignores the simultaneity of these decisions 
attributes greater effect of subsidies than warranted because cross-sectional variation in subsidy 
payments cannot adequately control for unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., soil quality) that is 
closely associated with payment levels, leading to estimates that are almost surely biased too 
large.  A related critique is found in the joint determination of subsidies and production; as 
farmers alter the number of base acres they operate each year, e.g., through farmland rental or 
purchase, they simultaneously alter the total subsidy they receive and the total amount they produce.  This relationship is not causal however.  It is simply the by-product of the farmer’s 
decision to farm more or fewer base acres.  Conversely, measurement error in self-reported 
subsidy receipts results in finding a smaller-than-warranted effect. 
 
Empirical Strategy 
The data and methods of this paper overcome these sources of bias to estimate the true, causal 
effect of decoupled subsidies on production. Scientists use careful, experimental techniques to 
draw causal inference, often relying on randomization or case-control studies. Social scientists 
rarely have the opportunity to use markets as experimental laboratories. Consequently, existing 
studies highlighting the association between decoupled agricultural subsidies and crop 
production cannot make credible causal inferences without making strong assumptions about 
unobservable and/or mis-measured confounding factors. The contribution of this paper is to use 
an instrumental variables approach to isolate variation in decoupled subsidies that is unrelated to 
myriad confounding influences, such as a farmer’s entrepreneurial skill or farmland productivity 
(see Angrist and Krueger, 2001, for an excellent overview of the usefulness of instrumental 
variables in this context). The instrumental variables approach makes it credible to assert that an 
observed association between payments and agricultural production is a causal relationship 
rather than simply a correlation.   
 
Using random, weather-induce yield shocks, we isolate exogenous variation in decoupled 
subsidies that is unrelated to confounding influences on production. As is often the case in the 
program evaluation literature (Meyer, 1995; Angrist and Krueger, 2001), the policy details 
provide useful exogenous variation. In this case, it is found in the subsidy calculation. A farmer’s total decoupled subsidy receipt equals the product of the legislatively set subsidy rate, the 
number of subsidized (i.e., base) acres, and the farm’s program payment yield (PPY). This 
paper’s unique contribution can be found in the details of the PPY. A base acre’s PPY was 
determined in 1986 as the 5-year Olympic (dropping the highest and the lowest values) average 
of that acre’s yield from 1981-1985. The PPY used to determine subsidies in 1997 is thus a 
function of the idiosyncratic yield variation between 1981 and 1985.   
 
Data 
Using crop-specific, county-level yield data from the National Agricultural Statistical Service 
from as early as 1919, we calculate yield shocks as the deviation of the actual yield from the 
expected yield. Averaging the yield shocks between 1981 and 1985 provides a summary measure 
of the idiosyncratic component of the PPY, and thus the random component of decoupled 
subsidies. Administrative data obtained from the Farm Services Agency through a Freedom of 




Preliminary results indicate the strength of this instrument (see table 1). Early-1980’s yield 
shocks alone explain 25 percent of the 1997 rice PFC payment variation and 15 percent of the 
cotton subsidy variation. The instrument explains 10 percent of the corn subsidy variation in the 
Heartlands and 13-percent of the corn subsidy variation in the Northern Great Plains. Across all 
other program crops there is good statistical evidence of this instrument’s ability to explain 
decoupled subsidy variation.  
For the second-stage, we consider several production measures:  the share of cropland dedicated 
to the specific program crop, the share of cropland dedicated to any program crop, and total sales 
per acre of farmland.  Preliminary 2
nd-stage results indicate modest positive production effects 
for the share of acreage dedicated to the subsidized crop, but little or no effect on other program 
crops or on total agricultural sales.  The level of the effects estimated for 1992 (well before 
policy makers seriously considered decoupled payments), are similar to those estimated for 1997, 
and 2002 (one and six years after the policy change).  While decoupled payments appear to have 
significant if modest effects on production, effects stemming from the 1996 FAIR Act appear 
minimal. 
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Wheat F  27.56  0.7 5.97  7.41  19.79  1.26  10.28  8.79  2.68 1.25 
R
2 0.0109  0.0014  0.0207  0.0409  0.0492  0.0047  0.024  0.053  0.0192  0.0086 
Corn F  0.93  58.14  1  24.84  3.1  0.32  38.35  3.55  1.37  3.57 
R
2 0.0004  0.0972  0.003  0.1344  0.011  0.0009  0.0819  0.024  0.0252  0.0235 
Barley F  2.95  0.43 7.1 0.18  0  0.24  0.03  2.85  8.43  -- 
R
2 0.0025  0.0047  0.0302  0.0011  0  0.0046  0.0002  0.025  0.0572  -- 
Oats F  0.94  9.42  5.96  7.94  0.93  0.96  2.48  1.64  0.6  0.51 
R
2 0.0006  0.0218  0.0203  0.0722  0.0057  0.009  0.0104  0.0183  0.0066  0.0326 Sorghum F  42.6  0.83  --  13  0.49  8.2  8.52  0.14  0.01  13.23 
R
2 0.0283  0.0025  --  0.1625  0.0013  0.0671  0.0247  0.0018  0.0013  0.0887 
Cotton F  95.84  0.01  --  -- 74.13  3.87  39.03  0.09  0.19  46.63 
R
2 0.1473  0.0022  --  --  0.3511  0.0996  0.1613  0.0016  0.0599  0.3116 
Rice F  41.06  0.1 -- --  18.04  0.23  3.66  43.33  -- 3.3 
R
2 0.2598  0.0497  --  --  0.9475  0.0206  0.3432  0.6161  --  0.0538 
Notes: Dependent variable = County-level 1997 PFC payment per Base acre.  Explanatory variable = 1981 - 1985 Average Yield 
Deviation from linear trend. 
 